The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

Civil Rights in the 1990's: Non-Discrimination or
Quotas?
Donald B. Ayer

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law
and Race Commons
Recommended Citation
Ayer, Donald B. (1991) "Civil Rights in the 1990's: Non-Discrimination or Quotas?," Akron Law Review: Vol. 24 :
Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Ayer: Civil Rights

CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 1990'S: NON-DISCRIMINATION
OR QUOTAS?
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BRUCE MANSFIELD LECTURE

by
DONALD B. AYER*
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UNIVERSITY OF AKRON SCHOOL OF LAW

It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to talk with you about civil rights
policy as. it is being debated in this country during the latter part of the twentieth
century. During the last few years I have been fortunate to occupy a prime vantage
point on this discussion, first as the Deputy Solicitor General in charge of overseeing
the civil rights filings of the United States in the Supreme Court, and, for the past
several months, as the Deputy Attorney General, involved in putting together the
administration's position on pending civil rights legislation dealing with many of the
issues that the Supreme Court has been addressing in recent years.
Throughout the late 1970's and 1980's, our courts and legislatures have
confronted, again and again, the question of how to go about assuring equal
opportunity in a society where historical discrimination has left members of minority
groups in the position of enjoying a lesser share of the benefits that this society has
to offer. More specifically, the debate has focused on the question of affirmative
action -- that is the use of race or sex, or some other trait, as an affirmative basis for
selecting a particular candidate -- in employment, or school admission, or what have
you.
I would like today to offer some thoughts on the way that we as a country have
handled the issue of reverse discrimination as a means of pursuing equal opportunity.
The burden of my message is essentially positive. This is a serious and difficult issue,
and we have tended to approach it as such. It has been the focus of much honest
disagreement and frank debate, especially in our courts. In my view, the conclusions
that have been reached have been thoughtful and sensible, if not always the precise
ones that I would have preferred.
* Partner with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975; M.A.,
Harvard Univ., 1973; A.B., Stanford Univ., 1971; Formerly Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Jutice,
Washington D.C. 1989-1990; Principal Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
1986-1988; United States Attorney, Eastern Dist. of California, Sacramento CA, 1981-1986. Delivered at
the University of Akron School of Law on April 17, 1990.
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My first observation is that there is an undeniable tension between competing
approaches to racial and gender justice that have been advanced and pursued in
recent years. I take as my starting point the fundamental principle embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause (as well as the Declaration of Independence), that, as the
elder Justice Harlan said in dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,' the Constitution is
colorblind, and does not allow for official distinction by governmental bodies on the
basis of a person's race. This principle reached its long-delayed realization in the
1954 decision in Brown v. BoardofEducation,2and has been at the core of most civil
rights enforcement since that time. The numerous civil rights statutes of the 1960's
and '70's had as their fundamental premise the notion that treatment of persons on
account of certain specified immutable traits that are unrelated to merits or ability is
wrong as a matter both of morality and of national policy.
It is this principle, with which I think we all can agree, which has given the
moral strength to the civil rights movement. Martin Luther King's dream of a world
where people are judged based on the content of their character and not on the color
of their skin, is, I think, the unchallenged and undisputed objective to which decent
people aspire. And yet, at the same time, the progress toward that objective has been
less rapid than one would hope. It has been significant. But there have been fits t.- d
starts, and from time to time our forward progress faces discouraging obstacles, such
as we now see with the recent upturn in racial violence. It is the case that economic
success has not been enjoyed equally by members of all groups throughout society.
The reasons for this are complex, but the consequences are clearly regrettable.
In order to speed progress toward true equality, our political branches and our
courts, during the 1970's and '80's, undertook creative efforts to assure a heightened
level of minority participation by making their minority status an affirmative basis
for decision. Such affirmative action or reverse discrimination has taken many
forms. It has been utilized by both government and the private sector. It has been
a feature of court decrees, as part of remedial plans to deal with past discrimination.
It has been incorporated into voluntarily instituted affirmative action plans, designed
to bring an employer's work force into closer accord with the racial or gender
breakdown of the potential work force. While it has been employed most frequently
in the context of employment issues, reverse discrimination has also been significant
in other areas as well, including government contracting, where minority and gender
set-aside provisions have been widely adopted by local governmental bodies as a
means of advancing minority participation.
Anyone who has followed the course of Supreme Court litigation on these
issues knows that the decisions have been difficult and certainly not all one way. At
different times it has looked like one side might be about to sweep all the opposing
pieces off the board and declare total victory. Perhaps it looked that way during.the
'163 U.S. 537 (1896), overld by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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late 1970's, for those favoring reverse discrimination, after the Supreme Court's
decision in Weber,3 where the Court gave very broad berth to voluntary affirmative
action by a private employer. And, to many in the Reagan Administration, it looked
as though total victory for the non-discrimination principle might be imminent
during the mid-1980's, after the Stotts' decision came down using language easily
read to state that only the victims of discrimination could be awarded judicial relief
under Title VII. Those and other sweeping victories have, over time, proven to be
illusory, and we are left with a state of the law which is both more thoughtful and less
tidy.
With trepidation, an open acknowledgement that one is oversimplifying, and
a recognition that the last chapter has certainly not yet been written, it is possible to
recite briefly the current state of the law with regard to reverse discrimination. In
doing so, it is now clear that one must draw a clear distinction between actions of
private employers, whose conduct is limited only by statutory restrictions, and those
of a governmental body, which must meet the stricter limits imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause. Following Weber' and the 1987 decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,6 it appears that a private employer has significant leeway to take
voluntary steps to alleviate racial or gender imbalances in a work force. While I
helped write a brief for the government in the Johnson case that argued for tighter
limitations on private affirmative action, the majority read Title VII to allow for the
use of race or sex as a factor in employment decisions where there is a manifest
imbalance between the employer's work force and the available labor pool.
Where action by a governmental body is concerned, however, the strict
commandment of the Equal Protection Clause is triggered, and reliance on a
protected trait as a basis for action is only proper in very limited and carefully
circumscribed situations. As in other cases raising a question of equal protection of
the laws, such conduct must be justified not simply by an ordinary concern in state
policy, but rather by a compelling state interest. That test has been further elaborated
in terms of a two-step analysis. The first step in justifying such a practice is the
specific identification of prior discrimination that is being remedied. More than a
vague reference to general societal conditions or to statistical imbalance is required.
Without first singling out the particular history of discrimination that the action is
designed to address, action by the government in utilizing a race- or genderconscious remedy will be treated as unjustified discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
But the mere identification of prior discrimination needing a remedy does not
suffice to justify affirmative discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The
I United

Stee

,f An-,i ica, AFL-CiO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
o'rkcrs

4 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).

5443 U.S. 193.
6 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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race-conscious remedy adopted must also be shown to be narrowly tailored to
address the wrong that has been identified. This is not a concept that one can define
with great precision, and perhaps it is easier to identify in its absence than its
presence. Take, for example, last spring's minority set aside case of City of
Richmond v. Croson.7 There the city's plan provided that 30 percent of contract
money should go to a list of minorities which include Eskimos and Aleuts, which
groups are virtually unrepresented in the Richmond area, and who could not
remotely be shown to have experienced serious discrimination there. Certainly that
was not a remedy that could be described as narrowly tailored to fit a wrong needing
remedy.
One can argue about the correctness of this resolution of the affirmative action
issue, and many people have been doing just that for some time. It is not perfect. It
leaves a decided tension between the principle of non-discrimination, which is
fundamental, and the remedial objective of securing more extensive representation
of groups which have suffered discrimination in the past. There is no doubt that the
Supreme Court has allowed for the possibility that people will be chosen for jobs
because of traits that we would like to view as totally irrelevant. But, at least where
governmental action is in issue, that can happen only in limited situations. Furthermore, one is left with the sense from the Supreme Court's language that race- and
sex-conscious remedies are viewed, even in the limited circumstances where they
are acceptable, as temporary measures, suitable at this time in our history, but not
necessarily for the indefinite future.
My purpose today is not principally to argue for a particular conclusion with
regard to the conflict between non-discrimination and reverse discrimination. I
happen to believe that there is much to be said for the accommodation that the court
has reached, at least where the Equal Protection Clause is concerned. It has the
advantage of allowing for some remedial flexibility, but only allows for the
utilization of a race-conscious or gender-conscious approach where much thought
has been invested into seeking other alternatives. It also limits and focuses the
remedy in a way that will minimize its intrusion on the fundamental moral principle
that discrimination -- for whatever reason -- must not be a common tool in the

armamentarium of American justice.
The primary message I do want to convey is that whatever I or anyone else may
think about the merits of the position that the Supreme Court has reached, the
question of affirmative action is one that merits substantial debate and discussion.
The answers are never going to be crystal clear. This is one of the ways, in the words
of the Chinese curse, that we are destined to live in interesting times. It is a
conundrum, and in a democracy such issues are dealt with by ventilation and debate.
That is as it should be, and it is our security that whatever resolutions are reached,
whether by a court or a legislature, must stand up in the light of day.
7City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/1
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It is in that vein that I would like to talk to you about the proposed KennedyHawkins civil rights bill, 8 which was announced in early February, and whose
sponsors are pressing for early passage. This is an omnibus -- perhaps better
described as a blunderbus -- bill, in the broadest sense of that term. It purports to
reverse five major decisions of the Supreme Court from the 1988 term, and a number
of other more minor decisions from that and prior years. There are definitely some
things in it that deserve your support. The Bush Administration has endorsed similar
legislation in two areas relating to Supreme Court decisions of last term. In Patterson
v. McLean Savings,9 where the Court read narrowly the applicability of 42 USC
1981, relating to intentional racial discrimination in contracting, we have urged the
revision of that statute so as to assure its coverage of intentional discrimination in any
aspect of dealings relating to governmental or private contracts. Also, in Lorance
v. AT & T Technologies,'0 where the Court construed Title VII in a way to bar many
of those affected by intentionally discriminatory seniority provisions from ever
having a day in court, we have also urged a change restoring to such plaintiffs the
right to sue.
Other aspects of the bill make far less sense. It undertakes a total reconceptualization of our federal employment discrimination law, Title VII -- which has
served us well for 25 years -- in a way that will greatly expand plaintiffs' damage
remedies. There is good reason to expect that this would convert the statute from a
mechanism designed to put discrimination victims back into their rightful place, into
an engine of litigation which will create a lottery atmosphere. Rather than working
to settle discrimination litigation quickly, in order to get plaintiffs back to work and
end the dissension which is harmful to both morale and productivity, one can expect
that plaintiffs and lawyers alike will persist in court for years in hopes of hitting the
jackpot big.
In the area of mixed-motive employment decisions, where, for example, a
particular decision to terminate comes about based on both proper and improper
motivations, the Supreme Court in the Price Waterhouse" decision concluded that
the employer can prevail by proving that the adverse action would have been taken
in any event, even if the improper discriminatory motive had not existed. In that
instance, Justice Brennan concluded for the majority, it cannot be said that the
termination resulted from any discriminatory action, since it would have come about
were no such motive present. Notwithstanding this reasoning, the bill provides that
a plaintiff in such a circumstance can recover damages from the employer -apparently for the employer's act of thinking an improper thought, although it had
no consequence to the plaintiff. Such a provision is unprecedented in the law and,
I think, raises serious constitutional questions under the First Amendment.
Sess. (1990).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989).
zSL.2i04, H.R. 4000, 1i0st Cong., 2a

"Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
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My greatest concern, however, lies with the aspects of the Kennedy-Hawkins
bill that would quietly institutionalize reverse discrimination and, more specifically,
quotas as a basic fact of American life. These parts of the bill, which concern the
Court's decisions in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio12 and Martin v. Wilks, 3 are
being promoted by the sponsors in a much less than candid way. We are told
repeatedly that the bill has nothing to do with quotas. It is just a restoration of civil
rights that previously existed, before the Supreme Court took them away. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
In Wards Cove Packing,4 the Court recognized three fundamental principles
relating to the allocation of burdens in employment discrimination cases alleging
discriminatory or disparate impact. The Kennedy-Hawkins bill seeks to reverse all
of them. Moreover, the bill would establish a proof scheme wherein a plaintiff need
only show that the employer's selection process viewed as a whole produces a
statistical imbalance. If he or she does so, the burden of proof would shift to the
employer to either negate the showing of imbalance, or to demonstrate that any
selection device which does produce a disparate selection rate is essential to the
employer's business.
This is a very heavy burden which will be virtually impossible for an employer
to carry. Previous Supreme Court cases have demanded only that there be a
reasonable relationship between the selection device and the job for which it is being
utilized. The new test would demand that the device be not merely job-related, but
that it be something that the employer can not do without. If it is enacted into law, °
one can be certain that a rational employer is going to avoid the path of litigation
which he or she can not possibly win. The only way to do that is to make sure that
no statistical imbalance results from the hiring and promotion decisions made. That
means that, explicitly or implicitly, hiring will be done in accordance with a quota.
The authors of Kennedy-Hawkins do not want to talk about that.
In the Wilks"5 case, the court was confronted with the question of whether
white firefighters in Birmingham who had not participated in a previous litigation
retained the right to challenge on constitutional grounds the consent decree which
had been entered in that litigation. The consent decree utilized a hiring and
promotion quota as a mechanism to remedy a history of prior discrimination.
Without deciding the merits of the plaintiffs' challenge to the consent decree, the
Supreme Court decided as a matter of ordinary civil procedure and due process that
they have a right to a day in court in order to have those constitutional claims heard.
The Kennedy-Hawkins bill would reverse that conclusion as well. It would single
out federal employment discrimination cases to be treated differently from all other
12

Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989).

"3Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989).
14 109 S.Ct. at 2118-2127.
15109 S.Ct. at 2182-88.
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types of civil litigation, and make them virtually immune from challenge by parties
whose rights they effect and who have never had an opportunity to have their claims
heard.
Where a person had notice of the prior proceeding, or lacking that, if his or her
interests were adequately represented there, or, even failing that, if the court
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide notice to interested persons,
the person will be foreclosed from challenging the prior decision. This approach is
completely at odds with the basic principle of American jurisprudence that a person
has a right to a day in court. It is designed to protect civil rights decrees, including
those implementing quota remedies, from further judicial scrutiny by people
wanting to assert that the decrees cannot stand under the Supreme Court's limitations
on the use of reverse discrimination.
I believe that these provisions of the proposed legislation are unsound. And
I believe that if they are honestly discussed and seen for what they are, they will be
rejected. They are not responsive to the Supreme Court's call to hard thinking about
these difficult issues. They are not an effort to learn to live with real tensions in our
beliefs and priorities. The campaign for adoption of the Kennedy-Hawkins legislation is rather more like trying to smuggle an elephant by insisting that it is a mouse.
The sponsors simply insist that the bill has nothing to do with quotas and other raceconscious remedies. They are aided in that undercover operation by the complexity
of the provisions, and the sheer volume of material that has been put forward in the
bill. I ask your help in piercing this veil of obscurity, and insisting that these issues
so central to our national conscience be made the subject of a full and open discussion.
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